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In this chapter, we analyze empirically the existence and extent of financial contagion in the 
East Asian crisis.  We define financial contagion as a significant increase in correlation of 
financial variables after controlling fundamentals and common shocks, and we develop an 
autoregressive model to measure contagion.  In particular, we attempt to exclude the common 
effects of the crisis in Southeast Asia on the East Asian NIE 4, and examine the existence of pure 
contagion among NIE 4.  Our empirical results suggest that the Southeast Asian crisis did not 
directly trigger the crisis in Korea, but that its fallout to Taiwan played an important role in 
causing the Korean crisis.  This result is consistent with the argument that the crisis in Korea 
was precipitated by foreign banks that after Taiwan was first affected by the Southeast Asian 
crisis in October 1997, drastically refused to roll over short-term loans to the Korean financial 
institutions, rather than portfolio investors.              
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last three years, there has been a growing body of literature on the East Asian 
crisis.  A website created by Roubini, for example, lists more than 500 articles on the crisis.  
Despite the proliferation of studies on East Asian financial turmoil, the causes of the crisis still 
remain controversial.  Radelet and Sachs (1998), Feldstein (1998), and Stiglitz (1999) argue 
that the primary source of the crisis was the sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence.  
According to these authors, foreign lenders and institutional investors were so alarmed by the 
Thai crisis, which broke out in July 1997, that they abruptly pull their investments out of the 
other countries in the region, causing the crisis to be contagious.  Their withdrawal was in turn 
prompted by the belief that these countries suffered from the similar structural problems that 
had invited a speculative attack in Thailand. 
As opposed to this financial panic view, many others, including the IMF, pointed to 
structural weaknesses and policy distortions as the major causes of the crisis, although they 
acknowledged that the panic reaction also played a role (Corsetti et al., 1998). 
Among the East Asian crisis countries, Korea endured the most painful and 
unexpected financial turbulence.  Over a two-month period, from October to December 1997, 
this new OECD member was reduced from being the world’s 11th largest economy to an 
economy surviving on overnight loans from the international money markets. 
Since the beginning of 1999, Korea has been able to engineer an impressive recovery 
from the crisis.  The exchange rate has been stable between 1,100 and 1,200 won to a dollar, 
and the stock market has seen a sharp rebound.  Furthermore, interest rates are now in the 
single digits.  With the return of consumer confidence, there has been a surge in domestic 
demand.  As a result of this surge and robust export growth, the economy grew more than 10 
percent in 1999 in a striking contrast to the previous year’s shrinkage of more than six percent.  
The current account recorded a sizeable surplus, and prices have been stable. 
In view of the recent recovery, which is much faster than anticipated, many experts are 
now asking how a country with strong economic fundamentals like Korea could have become 
victim to a currency crisis in the first place.  If succumbing to the crisis seemed unlikely, the 
turnaround of Korea has been even more surprising. 
Despite Korea’s structural weaknesses and policy distortion, the Korean experience 
raises the question of whether foreign investors should in part be held responsible for creating 
and deepening the crisis.  There is the suspicion that too many foreign banks and institutional 
investors did not uphold due diligence in their lending to and investment in Korea. 
What developments have made foreign investors so drastically change their 
expectations as to the future prospects of the Korean economy?  It is often suggested that 
foreign investors were increasingly dismayed by and concerned about the structural weaknesses 
of the Korean economy that made Korea a highly risky place for portfolio investment and bank 
lending, and that at a certain point they were simply fed up and left.  It is true that they have 
long known and complained about the lack of transparency in corporate management in Korea, 
always questioned the reliability of balance sheets and income statements of large corporations 
and banks, and warned about the risks involved in the cross-ownership and cross-debt 
guarantees between the affiliates of Korea’s major conglomerates.1 
These problems, however, were not serious enough for them to contemplate a sudden 
withdrawal from Korea before the Southeast Asian currency crisis erupted.  In fact, even well 
into the mouth of November, according to a survey by the Korea Development Institute,2 many 
foreign investors were “optimistic” about the future of the Korean economy.  Only two weeks 
later would they become so negative about it and leave all at once.  This mass exodus caused a 
bank run problem in which everyone divests from a country or a region at the same time, taking 
their money out of their investments almost regardless of whether those investments were good 
or bad. 
The chain of events leading up to the crisis in November 1997 therefore shows that 
Korea has been adversely affected by the contagion of the Southeast Asian crisis and, in 
particular, that the stock market crash of Taiwan and Hong Kong sparked off the exodus of 
institutional investors out of Korea.  Given the relatively strong economic fundamentals, would 
Korea not have come under speculative attack had proper measures been taken to contain the 
Southeast Asian crisis? 
The exact causes of the crisis in East Asia will not be known anytime soon.  However, 
the strong recovery underway in East Asia, in particular in Korea, in the past few months adds 
weight to the panic view.  That is, the East Asian crisis should in a large measure be attributed 
to the panic reaction and herd behavior of foreign investors rather than a deterioration in 
fundamentals, and for this reason, the Thai crisis was much more contagious than otherwise. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze empirically the existence and extent of crisis 
contagion in the eight East Asian countries.  In particular, we will focus on the question of 
whether Korea would have come under speculative attack had proper measures been taken to 
contain the crisis in the ASEAN countries.  We develop an autoregressive model and estimate 
it for the eight East Asian countries (ASEAN 4 plus NIE 4) to examine the existence and the 
process of contagion in these countries.  In addition, we attempt to exclude the common effects 
of the crisis in ASEAN 4 on the East Asian NIE 4, and examine the existence of pure contagion 
among NIE 4.  This chapter is organized as follows.  Our empirical tests are explained in 
section 2, and an interpretation of the empirical results is given in section 3.  Concluding 
remarks are in the final section. 
 
 
2. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF CONTAGION IN EAST ASIA 
 
2.1 Definition of Contagion 
 
Contagion in general refers to the spread of market disturbances from one country to 
the other, which is observed through movements in exchange rates, stock prices, and interest 
rates.  Empirical examination of the evidence for contagion consists of four types of tests.  
The first estimates correlation coefficients of financial variables.  According to this approach, a 
marked increase in correlations among markets of different countries is regarded as evidence of 
contagion (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996 and Frankel and Schmukler, 1996).   
However, a high degree of correlation during the crisis period is not sufficient 
evidence of the presence of contagion.  If the two markets are traditionally highly correlated, 
then one can naturally expect a change in one market in response to a sharp change in the other 
market.  Thus, contagion can be identified only when correlations among markets increase 
during the crisis period.  In this correlation approach, empirical evidence of contagion is 
stronger, if the increase is statistically significant (Baig and Goldfajn , 1998 and Forbes and 
Rigobon, 1998). 
Even a signif icant increase in correlations, however, may not prove the existence of 
contagion, as it may result from major economic shifts in industrial countries and commodity 
prices as well as changes in domestic economic fundamentals, risk perception and preferences.  
Bhattachrya et al. (1998), Valdes (1997), Arias et al. (1998), and Baig and Goldfajn (1998) 
argue that the correlation estimation must therefore control these variables to identify pure 
contagion. 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Glick and Rose (1998) define contagion as a case where 
knowledge of a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of a crisis at home.  One advantage 
of this definition is that it readily allows statistical tests of the existence of contagion.  The 
second approach is based on this definition of contagion.  This approach examines whether the 
likelihood of crisis is higher when there are crises in other countries, by estimating the 
probability of a crisis conditional on information of the occurrence of crisis elsewhere.   
The third type of test estimates volatility among financial markets (Edwards, 1998 and 
Park and Song, 1998).  This approach examines whether conditional variances of financial 
variables are related to each other among markets in different countries during the crisis period.  
Usually a GARCH type model is used in this approach.  Finally, a fourth type of test examines 
whether foreign news affects financial variables at home (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999 and 
Ganapolsky and Schmukler, 1998). 
There are several empirical studies on contagion of the East Asian crisis.   Baig and 
Goldfajn (1998) show that the cross-countries correlation among currencies and sovereign 
spreads of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand significantly increased 
during the crisis period (from July 1997 to May 1998) as compared to the non-crisis period.  
They also show that the correlation of residuals from regressions of changes in exchange rate 
rates, stock returns, and sovereign spreads on domestic fundamentals and common shocks were 
high and statistically significant during the crisis period.  They, however, do not compare the 
correlation of residuals of the crisis period with that of the non-crisis period.    
On the other hand, Forbes and Rigobon (1998) find that the turmoil of the Hong Kong 
stock market, which started on October 17, 1997 was not contagious to other East Asian 
countries.  They show that the correlation coefficients of stock returns, after controlling the 
bias related to changes in market volatility, between Hong Kong and other East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) did not increase 
significantly during the Hong Kong turmoil as compared to the tranquil period.   
Investigating the effects of foreign news on domestic  stock returns, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (1999) present empirical evidence of contagion in the East Asian financial crisis.   
According to their results, U.S dollar denominated stock returns in crisis-affected East Asian 
countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, were also 
significantly influenced by the news generated in other crisis countries in East Asia during the 
period from the beginning of July 1997 to the end of May 1998.    
In this paper, we define financial contagion as a significant increase in correlation of 
financial prices such as the exchange rate, interest rates, and stock prices experienced by a 
group of countries, after controlling fundamentals and common shocks, following a crisis 
elsewhere.  Put differently, contagion refers to an excessive comovement of financial variables 
of a given group of countries during a financial crisis.   
We estimate the correlation coefficients of residuals from regression that controls 
fundamentals and common shocks as Baig and Goldfajn (1998) do. In addition, we also 
estimate for the non-crisis period, and examine whether there was a significant increase in 
correlation between the two periods.  As a proxy for fundamentals, we use a domestic interest 
rate variable instead of domestic news, which may not properly reflect continuous changes in 
fundamentals.   
 
2.2 The Model 
 
In order to measure the existence and extent of contagion during the East Asian crisis 
period, this paper focuses on two financial markets--the foreign exchange and stock markets--
and develops an autoregressive model to determine the exchange rate and stock return. 
Our model consists of the following two equations: 
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j
tS  is log of the exchange rate of country j ’s currency per U.S. dollar, and tYen  is 
log of the yen-dollar exchange rate. jti  and 
us
ti  indicate short-term interest rates in country j  
and the U.S., respectively.  We use the overnight call rate for jti and the federal fund rate for
us
ti .  
j
tR  and 
us
tR  are stock returns in country j  and the U.S. at time t measured by a stock price 
index.  D  indicates the first order difference operator, and jte  is an error term.  Country j  
is one of the eight East Asian countries.  In our specification, we include only lagged values of 
us
tR  and 
us
ti  in equations (1) and (2), due to the time difference between East Asia and the U.S.  
In the case of Hong Kong, we use a variable measuring foreign exchange market pressure 
instead of changes in the foreign exchange rate since Hong Kong has maintained a currency 
board system.3 )( jtt SYen D-D  in equation (2) indicates changes in the yen-dollar exchange 
rate relative to changes in the exchange rate of the currency of country j . 
Changes in the yen-dollar exchange rate and U.S. interest rate reflect common shocks, 
whereas changes in domestic economic fundamentals are assumed to be explained by changes 
in the domestic interest rate.  We determine the order of lags on the basis of Schwarz 
Information Criterion and significance of variables. 
Our empirical examination is divided into two stages.  In the first stage, we examine 
the existence of crisis contagion among the eight East Asian countries, namely four ASEAN 
countries (ASEAN 4)--Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand--and four East Asian 
NIEs (NIE 4)--Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.  The second stage analyses crisis 
contagion among NIE 4 after adjusting the impact of the crisis developments in the ASEAN 4 
on these economies. 
Using daily data, we estimate equations (1) and (2) for the eight countries and 
calculate residuals for the crisis period, which runs from July 2, 1997 to August 31, 1998. 
Residuals of equations (1) and (2) measure changes in the exchange rate and stock returns that 
are not explained by the independent and lagged dependent variables.  During the crisis period, 
an unexpected development in country j or the spillover effect of the crisis in other countries on 
country j is reflected in the residuals.  Consequently, if residuals of any pair of the sample 
countries are correlated, then it is highly likely that the crisis was contagious between the two 
countries.  However, estimated residuals may show a significant degree of correlation even in a 
tranquil period due to common shocks which are not captured by equations (1) and (2).  In 
order to isolate the effect of these common shocks, we also estimate equations (1) and (2) for 
the non-crisis period from January 2, 1995 to April 30, 1997, and then compare the two sets of 
equation whether there was any significant increase in correlation between a crisis and tranquil 
period. 
It is found that the explanatory power of the two equations is, in general, acceptable in 
most cases, considering that dependent variables are expressed in terms of change except for 
Indonesia and Malaysia for equation (1) during the non-crisis period (see Table 1).  For 
equation (2), the explanatory power is low for Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand during the non-
crisis period. 
To test the significance of changes in correlation, we use Anderson’s z-test (1958).  
Null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis of the test are ijnc
ij
cH rr =:0  and 
ij
nc
ij
cH rr >:1  
where ijcr  and 
ij
ncr  are correlation coefficients between country i  and j  during the crisis 
and non-crisis period, respectively. 4 
Our test results of equation (1), which are reported in Table 2, show that among 
ASEAN 4, correlation of residuals of the foreign exchange rates rose significantly during the 
crisis period, whereas among NIE 4 there occurred a significant increase in correlation between 
Taiwan on the one hand and Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea on the other.  Between ASEAN 
4 and NIE 4, only Singapore and Taiwan experienced a significant increase in correlation of 
residuals of the exchange rates with all of ASEAN 4 during the crisis period.  A similar 
development can be found between Korea on the one hand and ASEAN 4, but the increase was 
not statistically significant.  
As for the developments in stock markets, we observe that among ASEAN 4, the 
coefficient of correlation of residual of equation (1) for Thailand increased vis-à-vis Indonesia 
and the Philippines but not Malaysia.  Between ASEAN 4 and NIE 4, stock prices of both 
Taiwan and Korea moved closely together with those of Indonesia , Malaysia, and Thailand (see 
Table 3).   
The cases of Hong Kong and Singapore are somewhat surprising in that there was no 
evidence of significant comovement of its stock market together with those of ASEAN 4, except 
for the Philippines.  This result, however, does not mean that stock markets of both Hong Kong 
and Singapore were insulated from market developments in ASEAN 4, whereas the markets of 
Korea and Taiwan were not.  Instead, the weak significance of the increase in correlation of 
Hong Kong and Singapore with ASEAN 4 during the crisis period results from a traditionally 
close relation between the markets of the two groups of the countries during a normal period.  
That is, before the crisis, it is likely that the markets of ASEAN 4 were more closely integrated 
with those of Hong Kong and Singapore than Korea and Taiwan.  Because of this market 
integration, the correlation coefficients may not have gone up during the crisis period as much 
as otherwise.  Our results also indicate that among the NIE group, stock prices of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore moved closely together, but the Korean market reacted only to 
developments in the Singapore market. 
As noted earlier, correlation coefficients of residuals among the sample countries are 
likely to be biased as a measure of contagion, because they cannot differentiate between 
changes in financial variables caused either by crisis developments or common shocks.  For 
example, an increase in correlation between Taiwan and Korea may reflect crisis developments 
in ASEAN 4, which may have affected the financial markets of the two countries 
simultaneously.  
In order to eliminate this bias and to test the existence of pure contagion among NIE 4 
during the crisis, we estimate the following equation for these countries: 
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where jtuˆ  is the residual from equation (1) or (2) for country j which is one of NIE 4 and 
I
tuˆ , 
M
tuˆ , 
P
tuˆ , and 
T
tuˆ  are residuals from equation (1) or (2) for Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, respectively.  Since these residuals of NIE 4 are adjusted for the 
crisis in ASEAN 4, their correlations may identify and gauge the extent of crisis contagion 
between any pair in the NIE group. 
The test results of equation (3) are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  Compared to the 
results in Tables 2 and 3, correlation coefficients of residuals among NIE 4 obtained from 
estimation of equation (3) are lower than those from equations (1) and (2) during the crisis 
period, suggesting that there existed common effects of the crisis in ASEAN 4 on NIE 4.   
The results also indicate that financial turbulence was contagious among NIE 4 during 
the crisis, even after common effects from ASEAN 4 were controlled for.  For example, in the 
case of the foreign exchange market, the coefficients of correlation of residuals for Taiwan with 
those of Hong Kong and Korea shot up during the crisis period as compared to tranquil periods.  
There was no measurable  interaction between the foreign exchange markets of Taiwan on the 
one hand and those of Hong Kong and Korea during the periods preceding the crisis.  However, 
during the crisis the correlation coefficient rose to 0.10 vis-à-vis Hong Kong from zero and 0.19 
with Korea from 0.04.  These changes were also statistically significant. 
With regard to Singapore, Taiwan experienced a sharp increase in correlation during 
the crisis period in the first stage of estimation involving all eight East Asian countries.  When 
ASEAN 4 are excluded in the second stage, the correlation coefficient between the two rose to a 
lesser degree, and its statistical significance disappeared, suggesting that the increase could be 
attributed to the common effect of the crisis in ASEAN 4 on the two countries. 
Combining the results of estimation of contagion among the eight sample countries (first 
stage) and that of only NIE 4 (second stage), one could conclude that the crisis that broke out first 
in Thailand was contagious to NIE 4 as the crisis effect spilt over into the foreign exchange and 
stock markets of NIE 4.  When the common effect of the crisis in ASEAN 4 on NIE 4, however, 
are controlled for, our results show that the effects of financial turbulence in Taiwan, which in turn 
was caused by the turmoil in ASEAN 4, were transmitted to the foreign exchange markets of both 
Hong Kong and Korea, further deepening the crisis in the two countries.  
Why was Taiwan so important in spreading the crisis that erupted in Thailand to Hong 
Kong and Korea?  Our interpretation refers to the channel of contagion that focuses on 
economic similarities.  Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea were fast growing economies.  These 
East Asian “miracle” countries shared the export-oriented development strategy and were 
increasingly relying on the markets of ASEAN 4 for their export earnings.  When foreign 
banks and institutional investors saw that such a stable country like Taiwan with strong 
fundamentals was vulnerable to the crisis in Southeast Asia, they must have concluded that both 
Hong Kong and Korea would not be immune from the crisis.  Realizing these possible 
consequences of the Southeast Asian crisis, they started attacking the foreign exchange markets 
of Hong Kong and Korea.  Hong Kong was the first to be attacked; it was able to withstand the 
crisis, whereas Korea was not. 
As for developments in the stock markets of NIE 4 during the crisis period, we 
observe a large increase in correlation between Hong Kong and Taiwan and between Hong 
Kong and Singapore even after the effects of the ASEAN crisis are controlled for.  This result 
suggests that at least among the three countries the contagious effects were transmitted through 
the stock market.  A similar development cannot be found between Korea on the one hand and 
the other NIEs, although Korea’s stock market was also severely buffeted by the ASEAN crisis.  
This result is consistent with the argument that the crisis in Korea was precipitated by foreign 
banks that refused to roll over short-term loans and curtailed drastically inter-bank lending, 
rather than foreign equity investors. 
 
2.3 Specification Adjustments 
 
Our model consisting of equations (1) and (2) is defective as a framework for 
identifying and measuring contagion in two respects.  One defect is that it cannot capture 
potential changes in the pattern of behavior of market participants during the crisis period.  It is 
often argued that foreign lenders and portfolio investors exhibited herd behavior and also were 
prone to panic to the onset of the crisis.  If this is true, then coefficients of independent 
variables of equations (1) and (2) could change once market participants perceive the possibility 
of crisis contagion. 
Another criticism may be that the two equations determining the exchange rate and 
stock returns are not specified in a reduced form since in both equations the domestic short-term 
interest rate, which is an endogenous variable, enters as an independent variable.  In our model, 
the interest rate variable is included as a proxy variable to capture changes in domestic 
fundamentals.  However, since during the crisis period, domestic market interests rose 
markedly, residuals of equations (1) and (2) may not measure the extent of contagion properly, 
because the inclusion of jti  could alter the structure and the size of residuals of both equations 
during the crisis. 
In order to remedy these weaknesses, the following two adjustments are made in our 
estimation.  First, we estimate the two equations using only the data of the non-crisis periods 
before the onset of financial turmoil.  We then use these equations to calculate the residuals of the 
crisis period.  This adjustment attempts to show the difference in the magnitudes of residuals 
when the structure of the model is assumed to change as a result of the crisis and when it is not.   
It should be noted that the foreign exchange markets of Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand experienced two different types of structural changes: one from the change in the 
exchange rate system from a strictly managed floating to a free floating system, and the other 
from the financial crisis.  In our new estimation, however, we make an adjustment only for the 
structural changes originating in financial crisis.  Accordingly, in calculating residuals of these 
three countries for the crisis period, we use the results from the estimation of equation (1) for 
the period from October 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999, when the three countries were on a free 
floating system without severe financial turbulences.  
Our results of estimation adjusted for possible structural changes are shown in Tables 
6 through 9.  These results show that estimated values of coefficients of equations (1) and (2) 
for the crisis period are different from those for the non-crisis period.  This can be seen from 
the fact that correlation coefficients with the adjustment for the crisis period are different from 
those without adjustment.  For example, we can see from Tables 6 and 9 that correlation 
coefficients of residuals from equation (2) with adjustment are higher than those without 
adjustment in most of cases.5  
The results of significance tests, however, are almost identical to those of the model 
without the adjustment.6 Our previous finding that financial turbulence was contagious among 
NIE 4 during the crisis period even after the common effects of crisis in ASEAN 4 on this region 
are considered is still valid.  That is, the results of the new approach also suggest that there 
existed a contagion process between foreign exchange market of Taiwan on one hand and those of 
Korea and Hong Kong, as well as among the stock markets of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.   
We also respecify the dependent variable of equation (2) in order to derive a reduced 
form equation by excluding the interest rate as an independent variable from the equation.  For 
this purpose, we introduce a variable measuring foreign exchange market pressure as the 
dependent variable of equation (1).  This variable is defined as a weighted sum of changes in 
both the exchange rate and interest rate where the relative weight is determined so as to equate 
the conditional variances of the two variables.  In this new approach, we also estimate the 
model in terms of the non-crisis period data, and then use this structure to calculate the residuals 
of the crisis period.  The results of this new approach are found in Tables 10 and 11. 
This change lowers the values of correlation coefficients for the crisis period compared 
to the original specification.  This implies that the foreign exchange market pressures in East 
Asian countries were less related than foreign exchange rates during the crisis.7 The results of 
significance tests, however, are almost identical to those of our earlier approaches.  Particularly, 
in the case of NIE 4 analysis, the increase in the correlation coefficient between Taiwan and 
Korea during the crisis still remains significant.  The increase in the correlation coefficient 
between Taiwan and Hong Kong, however, is no longer significant. 
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Developments in East Asian financial markets after the crisis touched off in Thailand 
in July 1997 suggest that the Thai crisis spread first to the neighboring ASEAN economies and 
then to NIE 4.  Among the four more advanced economies in North East Asia, Singapore was 
the first to experience a serious fallout of the crisis in Southeast Asia, followed by Taiwan.  
The crisis then reached Hong Kong.  The stock market plunge in Hong Kong during the third 
week of October 1997 brought about the dive in the Korean market and outflows of foreign 
equity investment in subsequent weeks.   
According to our estimation of correlations of residuals of equation (1), the crisis in 
ASEAN 4 was not as contagious to Hong Kong and Korea as much as it could have under 
different circumstances.  However, there is clear evidence that Taiwan’s financial turbulence 
spread to both Hong Kong and Korea through the foreign exchange market.  Therefore, a 
series of events that took place before Korea sought IMF emergency financing suggests that 
Taiwan was at the center of the East Asian contagion process in that only after Taiwan came 
under speculative attack, Hong Kong experienced, and then Korea succumbed to, a similar 
attack. 
During the crisis, however, we observe somewhat different developments in the stock 
markets of the eight sample countries.  It is clear that the stock markets of Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore were closely linked to each other, and as a result of this linkage we find evidence 
that the crisis became contagious through the stock market.  With the onset of the Southeast 
Asian crisis, the stock market collapse in ASEAN 4 spilt over into the markets of all of the NIEs, 
including Korea.  Somewhat unexpectedly, however, we find that the stock market plunge in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore did not cause the sinking of the market in Korea, as much 
as it was expected.   
One explanation for the initial effects of collapse of ASEAN 4 on NIE 4, including 
Korea, is that foreign investors, in particular institutional investors such as open-end emerging 
market fund manager may have had to sell off stocks issued by firms in other emerging market 
economies such as Korea and Taiwan after the Thai crisis in order to raise cash, as they would 
naturally expect to see a high frequency of redemption in the wake of the Thai crisis.  Another 
interpretation is that the Thai crisis could well have induced foreign institutional investors to 
sell off their holdings in Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan in order to rebalance their portfolios. 
However, the foreign investors’ sell off was not serious enough to precipitate a 
financial crisis in Korea, largely because their holdings accounted for less than 15 percent of 
total capitalization of the Korean stock market at the time of crisis.  Only when Taiwan became 
a target of speculative attack following the crisis in ASEAN 4 did foreign banks with a large 
exposure to Korea began recalling their short and medium-term loans, reducing the availability 
of trade credit facilities and cutting off the lines of credit.  This provoked a liquidity crisis in 
Korea’s banking sector, which was in turn translated into a drainage of foreign exchange 
reserves.  In the end, the drainage led to the collapse of the foreign exchange market.   
What was so surprising about the crisis in Korea was that as late as in October 1997, 
no one including the IMF and the international credit agencies could have predicted that only 
two months later the economy would suffer such a severe financial distress in which the won 
fell by more than 50 percent against the U.S. dollar between November 19, 1997, when Korea 
decided to accept an IMF rescue plan and December 24, 1997, when the G-7 countries came out 
to pledge additional financing to avert Korea’s debt default.  During the same period, the stock 
price index (KOSPI) plummeted by 30 percent, and the short-term interest rate shot up to 40 
percent per annum. 
One month after Thailand came under speculative attack in July 1997, foreign 
investors began withdrawing their funds from the Korean stock market and out of the country, 
and by the fourth week of September, the stock price index fell by more than 100 points, from 
more than 800 before the Thai crisis.  Until then Korean banks had access to international 
short-term money and also to the inter-bank loan market.  During October, foreign portfolio 
investors moved out of the stock market in droves, and Korean banks found it increasingly 
difficult to secure new loans or to rollover the existing short-term loans.  The total amount of 
short-term foreign liabilities at financial institutions stood at around US $63 billion during the 
first nine months of the year.  Within two months, the figure fell by US $16 billion, because of 
foreign banks’ refusal to renew short-term loans and trade related credit facilities (see Table 12). 
Denied access at foreign banks, Korean financial institutions were forced to turn to the 
Bank of Korea for liquidity.  In November alone, the Bank of Korea lost US $15 billion of its 
reserves.  Beginning of December, the central bank had usable reserves less than US $8 billion 
(see Table 13). 
Unable to control the situation, the Korean government decided to approach the IMF 
for assistance on November 21.  Although the negotiation between the Korean government and 
the IMF was completed in a record time of 10 days by December 3 and secured a total of US$ 
21 billion for an emergency financing, the IMF package did little to allay fears and stabilize 
financial markets.  The exchange rate of the Korean won continued to depreciate against the 
U.S. dollar, and the Bank of Korea was not able to build up its of usable reserves.  The 
financial situation was unsustainable and in order to stop further hemorrhaging of the Korea 
economy, the IMF and G-7 countries came up with a US $10 billion emergency financing 
program, and finally, this package succeeded in turning the market confidence around. 
Why did then the foreign investors, in particular international banks and institutional 
investors including hedge fund managers, panic and pull out their investments suddenly and all 
at once?  As explained before, they must have concluded that if Taiwan with such strong 
economic fundamentals could become a target of speculative attack, a country like Korea with 
somewhat weaker fundamentals would be the next. 
They were also concerned about the possibility of competitive devaluation in East Asia.  
Most of the East Asian countries were locked in competition for a large export market share 
both within the region and in the U.S. and Europe.  If Taiwan’s exchange rate depreciates vis-
à-vis the U.S. dollar, they reasoned that Korea would also have readjusted their exchange rate so 
as not to lose their export competitiveness as compared to that of Taiwan.  This possibility of 
competitive devaluation could certainly have deepened the crisis and hastened the departure of 
foreign investors. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While the extent and depth of the crisis in Korea should in part be attributed to structural 
weaknesses and policy distortions, foreign investors should largely be held responsible for 
deepening the crisis by overreacting to a deterioration in financial conditions of corporations 
and financial institutions.  One could also ask whether Korea would have avoided the trauma 
had the channels of contagion of the crisis been blocked off through multilateral cooperation at 
the early stage of the crisis.  The rapid recovery of the economy in the past few months 
suggests that it would have, and our empirical study, while limited in scope, supports this view. 
A growing number of recent studies on contagion show that macroeconomic  similarities, 
strong trade and financial linkages between countries are the causes of spreading a crisis in one 
country to others.  Before the crisis broke out, East Asian NIEs did not share many 
macroeconomic similarities with ASEAN 4.  They were not linked with the Southeast Asian 
countries in terms of capital account transactions.  Although their exports to the region were 
growing, their linkage in trade with ASEAN 4 was not strong enough to serve as a major 
channel of contagion.8  This leads to the conclusion that financial panic and herd behavior 
were important causes of spreading the Thai crisis to NIE 4.  The financial markets of NIE 4 
suffered initially the fallout of the crisis in ASEAN 4.  But the fallout effect could have been 
measurable had foreign institutional investors been less frightened about the ensuing financial 
instability in Taiwan.  Once they saw the vulnerability of Taiwan to crisis, it appears that they 
concluded that Hong Kong and Korea were equally assailable. 
 
Notes 
 
* The authors would like to thank Peter Montiel and the participants of the Conference on International Finance 
Contagion: How It Spreads and How It Can Be Stopped  (organized by the World bank, IMF, and ADB) and KIEP 
seminar for their valuable comments.  The authors are alone responsible for all remaining errors.  
 
1. Banks and other financial institutions lent large sums of money to the conglomerates.  When these are netted out, 
the cross-guarantees mean that in many cases, the loans to the chaebols are not backed by collateral or payment 
guarantees, giving rise to greater risks.  Foreign investors had long been aware of this but thought nothing of it 
until just before the crisis. 
 
2. See Korea Herald, November 18, 1997. 
 
3. Eichengreen et al. (1996) measure foreign exchange market pressure by the weighted sum of changes in nominal 
exchange rate, interest rate and foreign exchange reserves.  Since the daily data for foreign exchange reserves are 
not available, we define, in this paper, the foreign exchange market pressure of Hong Kong as a weighted sum of 
changes in the exchange rate and interest rate where the relative weight is determined so as to equate the 
conditional variances of the two variables. 
 
4. Anderson’s z-test statistics are defined as follo ws :  
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5. Correlation coefficients of residuals of equation (2) with the adjustment are higher in 22 out of a total of 28 cases 
for the eight-country sample and 4 out of the six cases for the 4 NIE sample than without adjustment.  In the case 
of equation (1), correlation coefficients are higher in about a half of the total cases. 
 
6. This may stem from the low explanatory power of our model as can be seen Table 1.  This implies that some of 
the important variables that explain stock returns and changes in exchange rates may be omitted from our model.  
The low explanatory power also implies that daily fluctuations of these variables are more closely related to 
expectation changes in market sentiments rather than fundamentals and common shocks.  
 
7. Correlation coefficients are lower in 16 out of 28 cases for the eight-country sample compared to the original 
specification, while in the case of NIE 4, all correlation coefficients are lower. 
 
8. Singapore is probably an exception.  It had a strong direct trade linkage with Malaysia and Thailand before the 
crisis broke out .  
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Table 1: Explanatory Power of the Model 
 
Dep. Variables  Changes in Exchange Rate Stock Returns 
          Period 
Country  Non-Crisis  Crisis  Non-Crisis  Crisis  
Indonesia  0.05 0.08 0.16 0.18 
Malaysia  0.06 0.12 0.10 0.20 
Philippines  0.14 0.14 0.11 0.21 
Thailand 0.33 0.17 0.06 0.15 
Hong Kong 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.24 
Korea 0.13 0.32 0.04 0.18 
Singapore  0.13 0.20 0.17 0.25 
Taiwan 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.14 
Note: Numbers indicate adjusted 2R . 
Table 2: Test of Contagion among Eight East Asian Countries (Ⅰ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Non-Crisis Period 
Countries  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.09 1.00       
Philippines 0.02 -0.04 1.00      
Thailand 0.05 0.13 -0.01 1.00     
Hong Kong 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.11 1.00    
Korea 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.03 1.00   
Singapore 0.03 0.35 -0.09 0.22 0.01 0.09 1.00  
Taiwan 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.02 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.44 1.00       
Philippines 0.20 0.26 1.00      
Thailand 0.40 0.51 0.37 1.00     
Hong Kong -0.03 0.10 0.15 0.09 1.00    
Korea 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 1.00   
Singapore 0.41 0.64 0.27 0.51 0.09 -0.07 1.00  
Taiwan 0.18 0.25 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.19 0.23 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia -        
Malaysia  5.13* -       
Philippines  2.35*  4.06* -      
Thailand  5.00*  5.80*  5.14* -     
Hong Kong -1.21 1.01 0.63 -0.28 -    
Korea  0.61 0.61 0.83 0.04 0.65 -   
Singapore  5.48*  5.35*  4.88*  4.67* 1.10 -2.20 -  
Taiwan  2.29*  3.71*   1.93** 5.28*   1.91**   2.04** 3.40* - 
 
Notes:  1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table C are z-statistics . 
2) * : Significant at 1% level,  ** : Significant at 5% level. 
Table 3: Test of Contagion among Eight East Asian Countries (Ⅰ) - Stock Market 
 
A. Non-Crisis Period 
Countries  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.34 1.00       
Philippines 0.36 0.33 1.00      
Thailand 0.21 0.32 0.19 1.00     
Hong Kong 0.26 0.32 0.18 0.23 1.00    
Korea -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.05 1.00   
Singapore 0.40 0.57 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.02 1.00  
Taiwan 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.13 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.23 1.00       
Philippines 0.26 0.09 1.00      
Thailand 0.38 0.34 0.28 1.00     
Hong Kong 0.34 0.28 0.36 0.29 1.00    
Korea 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.23 0.03 1.00   
Singapore 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.13 1.00  
Taiwan 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.10 0.32 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia -        
Malaysia -1.74 -       
Philippines -1.51 -3.50 -      
Thailand   2.51*  0.41   1.36*** -     
Hong Kong  1.09 -0.64  2.63* 0.94 -    
Korea  0.81  2.99*  0.75 3.76* -0.32 -   
Singapore  0.49 -3.90   1.72** 1.19  3.12*   1.50*** -  
Taiwan   1.73**   1.87**  0.83 3.00*   1.99** 0.94 2.91* - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those o f Table C are z-statistics . 
2) * : Significant at 1% level,  ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 4 : Test of Contagion among East Asian NIE 4 (Ⅰ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Non-Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.03 1.00   
Singapore  0.00 0.09 1.00  
Taiwan 0.00 0.04 -0.01 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.09 1.00   
Singapore  0.04 -0.14 1.00  
Taiwan 0.10 0.19 0.01 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong -    
Korea 0.07 -   
Singapore  0.55 -3.02 -  
Taiwan   1.36*** 2.03** 0.23 - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table C are z-statistics . 
2) ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 5: Test of Contagion among East Asian NIE 4 (Ⅰ) - Stock Market 
 
A. Non-Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.07 1.00   
Singapore  0.28 0.04 1.00  
Taiwan 0.09 0.05 0.08 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea -0.02 1.00   
Singapore  0.41 0.07 1.00  
Taiwan 0.10 0.08 0.19 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong -    
Korea -1.13 -   
Singapore   1.79** 0.36 -  
Taiwan 0.28 0.36 1.41*** - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table C are z-statistics . 
2) ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 6: Test of Contagion among Eight East Asian Countries (Ⅱ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Crisis Period 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.44 1.00       
Philippines 0.23 0.28 1.00      
Thailand 0.40 0.51 0.35 1.00     
Hong Kong -0.01 0.10 0.14 0.06 1.00    
Korea 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.06 1.00   
Singapore 0.36 0.67 0.31 0.44 0.12 0.04 1.00  
Taiwan 0.15 0.25 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.14 0.26 1.00 
 
B. Significance Test 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia -        
Malaysia 5.45* -       
Philippines 2.92* 4.70* -      
Thailand 5.18* 6.02* 5.16* -     
Hong Kong -1.05 1.11 0.46 -0.65 -    
Korea 0.80 1.31*** 1.24 0.89 0.44 -   
Singapore 4.94* 6.34*  5.70.*  3.61*   1.54*** -0.69 -  
Taiwan 2.00** 4.02* 2.88* 4.85* 2.40*    
1.35*** 
4.06* - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Table A indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table B are z-statistics . 
2) Correlation coefficients in the non-crisis period are the same as those in Table 2. 
3) * : Significant at 1% level,  ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 7: Test of Contagion among Eight East Asian Countries (Ⅱ) - Stock Market 
 
A. Crisis Period 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.26 1.00       
Philippines 0.30 0.24 1.00      
Thailand 0.37 0.35 0.33 1.00     
Hong Kong 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.29 1.00    
Korea 0.05 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.07 1.00   
Singapore 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.70 0.13 1.00  
Taiwan 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.29 1.00 
 
B. Significance Test 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia -        
Malaysia -1.29 -       
Philippines -0.88 -1.41 -      
Thailand  2.31* 0.56  1.85** -     
Hong Kong   1.46*** 0.88 3.97* 1.00 -    
Korea 0.89 3.32*  1.50*** 3.77* 0.26 -   
Singapore   1.39*** -1.79 3.77* 1.01 5.59*  1.41*** -  
Taiwan   1.58*** 2.22* 0.88 3.02* 2.79*  1.73** 2.34* - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Table A indicate correlation coefficients, and those of numbers in Table B are z-statistics. 
2) Correlation coefficients in the non-crisis period are the same as those in Table 3. 
3) *: Significant at 1% level,  ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 8: Test of Contagion among East Asian NIE 4 (Ⅱ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.08 1.00   
Singapore  0.05 -0.07 1.00  
Taiwan 0.12 0.15 0.07 1.00 
B. Significance Test 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong -    
Korea 0.06 -   
Singapore  0.66 -2.13 -  
Taiwan  1.65**   1.44*** 1.19 - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Table A indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table B are z-statistics . 
2) Correlation coefficients in the non-crisis period are the same as  those in Table 4. 
3) ** : Significant at 5% level,  *** : Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 9: Test of Contagion among East Asian NIE 4 (Ⅱ) - Stock Market 
 
A. Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.00 1.00   
Singapore  0.49 0.01 1.00  
Taiwan 0.19 0.12 0.15 1.00 
B. Significance Test 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong -    
Korea -0.97 -   
Singapore   3.30* -3.39 -  
Taiwan   1.40*** 0.86 0.91 - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Table A indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table B are z-statistics . 
2) Correlation coefficients in the non-crisis period are the same as those in Table 5. 
3) *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 10: Test of Contagion among Eight East Asian Countries (Ⅲ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Non-Crisis Period 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.04 1.00       
Philippines 0.00 -0.03 1.00      
Thailand 0.01 0.06 -0.01 1.00     
Hong Kong 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 1.00    
Korea 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 1.00   
Singapore 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.10 1.00  
Taiwan 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia 1.00        
Malaysia 0.30 1.00       
Philippines 0.15 0.30 1.00      
Thailand 0.31 0.42 0.15 1.00     
Hong Kong -0.06 0.13 0.14 0.06 1.00    
Korea 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.07 -0.02 1.00   
Singapore 0.16 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.06 0.13 1.00  
Taiwan 0.16 0.27 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.09 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Hong 
Kong 
Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Indonesia -        
Malaysia  3.66* -       
Philippines  2.10* 4.84* -      
Thailand  3.07* 5.39* 2.28* -     
Hong Kong -1.29   1.29*** 1.06 0.66 -    
Korea -0.51 1.24 -0.16 -0.06 -1.78 -   
Singapore   1.36***  3.94*  2.45*  2.88* -0.31 0.41 -  
Taiwan   1.43***  6.20*  4.93*  2.60*   1.76** 0.80 1.64*** - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table C are z-statistics . 
2) * : Significant at 1% level, ** : Significant at 5% level, *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 11: Test of Contagion among East Asian NIE 4 (Ⅲ) - Foreign Exchange Market 
 
A. Non-crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea 0.08 1.00   
Singapore  0.08 0.12 1.00  
Taiwan -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
 
B. Crisis Period 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1.00    
Korea -0.01 1.00   
Singapore  0.02 0.01 1.00  
Taiwan 0.01 0.07 0.02 1.00 
 
C. Significance Test 
Countries Hong Kong Korea Singapore  Taiwan 
Hong Kong -    
Korea -1.18 -   
Singapore  -0.78 -1.67 -  
Taiwan 0.77   1.55*** 0.50 - 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in Tables A and B indicate correlation coefficients, and those of Table C are z-statistics . 
2) *** : Significant at 10% level. 
Table 12: Korea’s  Total External Liabilities    
 
(end of period, bil. U.S. dollars ) 
1997 
Classifications 19951) 1996 
June Sep. Nov. Dec. 
 Long-term Liabilities (A)2) 
         (A/C, %) 
33.1 
(42.2) 
57.5 
(36.5) 
60.7 
(37.1) 
66.6 
(39.0) 
72.9 
(45.0) 
86.0 
(55.7) 
  I. Financial Institutions - 41.5 43.4 47.6 53.2 50.3 
    1. Domestic Financial Institutions  - 38.3 39.7 43.8 49.4 46.3 
       Domestic  - 24.5 27.9 31.3 31.0 29.9 
       Offshore  - 8.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.2 
       Foreign Branches  - 5.3 2.2 2.9 8.8 7.3 
    2. Foreign Financial Institutions - 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.0 
  Ⅱ. Domestic Firms  - 13.6 15.1 16.9 17.6 17.6 
  Ⅲ. Public  - 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 18.0 
 Short-term Liabilities  (B) 
         (B/C, %) 
45.3 
(57.8) 
100.0 
(63.5) 
102.8 
(62.9) 
104.0 
(61.0) 
88.9 
(55.0) 
68.4 
(44.3) 
  I. Financial Institutions - 78.0 77.7 78.3 63.1 43.8 
    1. Domestic Financial Institutions  - 65.2 63.5 62.0 45.9 28.9 
       Domestic  - 26.2 28.5 23.6 18.7 11.7 
       Offshore  - 12.7 13.0 13.1 11.3 8.7 
       Foreign Branches  - 26.4 22.0 25.3 16.0 8.5 
    2. Foreign Financial Institutions - 12.8 14.2 16.3 17.2 14.9 
  Ⅱ. Domestic Firms  - 22.0 25.1 25.8 25.8 24.7 
Total Liabilities  (C) 
(%) 
78.4 
(100.0) 
157.5 
(100.0) 
163.5 
(100.0) 
170.6 
(100.0) 
161.8 
(100.0) 
154.4 
(100.0) 
 
Notes : 1) The figures  for 1995 represent external debts as defined by the World Bank. 
2) Long-term liabilities  are those with maturities longer than one year, while those of short-term liabilities are 
less than one year.  
Source: The Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy. 
 
Table 13: Foreign Reserves  of the Bank of Korea 
 
 (end of period, bil. U.S. dollars) 
1997 1998 
Classifications 1996 
March June Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. 
 Official Foreign Reserve (A) 33.2 29.2 33.3 30.4 30.5 24.4 20.4 23.5 
 Deposits at Overseas Branches  (B) 3.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 16.9 11.3 11.0 
 Other (C) — — — — 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
   Usable Reserves  (A-B-C) 29.4 21.1 25.3 22.4 22.3 7.3 8.9 12.4 
 
Notes : Official foreign reserve holdings are based on the IMF definition.  Deposits at overseas branches are those 
deposits made by the Bank of Korea at overseas branches of Korean commercial banks.   
Source: The Bank of Korea. 
 
